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The Fall of the Spanish Armada:
Historiography, Identity and Reception
Péter Illik
This short study is based on the monograph titled A spanyol armada pusztulása (1588)
Historiográfia, identitás, recepció [The Fall of the Spanish Armada. Historiography, Iden-
tity and Reception], Budapest, 2017. The book was written by the author in Hungarian
language. This article offers a short analysis of the major lines in English historiogra-
phy, political speeches, works of art, journals and secondary school education in order
to show how the topic of the fall of the Spanish Armada evolved and became part of the
English reception.
[Reception; Historiography; Spanish Armada; Identity; Patriotism; Nationalism]
“Look. In 1588, the British navy successfully fought off the Spanish Armada. They had little
plates of squid and we had scurvy, but we did it. We held off the mighty forces of Napoleon,
fuelled by nothing but vegetables that had been cooked in porridge.”
(The Guardian)
Introduction1
“I have not written news of the Armada, as the rumours have been so various,
and I like to send trustworthy intelligence. Statements, however, are now cur-
rent from many quarters, Calais, Dieppe, Holland, etc., and it is considered
certain that the Armada has fought the English, and dealt them a mortal blow
– sending many of their ships to the bottom, and capturing others, whilst the
rest of the English fleet, to the number, they say, of 27 sails, has returned
much damaged to the port of London. These are all that could escape.”2
 Secondary School Teacher, former part-time lecturer at Pázmány Péter Catholic Uni-
versity, Ko˝rösi Csoma Sándor Két Tanítási Nyelvu˝ Baptista Secondary School, Szent-
endrei út 83, 1033 Budapest, Hungary. E-mail: peterillik@hotmail.com.
1 This short study is based on the following book: P. ILLIK, A spanyol armada pusztulása
(1588) Historiográfia, identitás, recepció, Budapest 2017.
2 Excerpt of the letter of Pedro De Alava, Rouen, 1588. September 1. (http://www.
british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/simancas/vol4/pp411-425).
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The invasion attempt of the Spanish Armada sent by King Philip II
(1556–1598) could have happened as mentioned above. But it did not.
The Armada led by the duke of Medina Sidonia could not rendezvous
with the ground forces of the Duke of Alva in the Netherlands, and
after the battle at Gravelines (8th August 1588) it was forced to the
North-Atlantic by ferocious winds. Therefore, it could not transport
the Spanish invasion force (of Parma and of those carried on the Ar-
mada) to England and had to skirt around the British islands to get
back to Spain. The Spanish fleet lost approximately half of its ships as
well as circa 18,000 soldiers and sailors. The story sounds simple upon
first sight, however, it contains many contradictory and ambiguous
facts which have been interpreted in different ways for hundreds of
years. That’s why the problem of the Spanish Armada is partly simi-
lar to the question “Is the glass half empty or half full?”, as it is a matter
of point of view and not merely of the specific facts. During the last
430 years there were several ways of interpretation in English historio-
graphy, literature and journalism.
The Spanish Armada was not defeated (in its traditional meaning)
by the English fleet, as the latter could scuttle circa five Spanish ships
only.3 The Spanish lost half of their ships during their travel to and
from the British isles and half of their sailors and troops carried on the
Armada vessels.4 But whether it was a terrible loss or not is also ques-
tionable, as for example in the battle at Mohács (1526) the Hungarians
lost 80 % of their forces to the Ottomans.5 Badweather and storms also
had a significant role in the failure of the expedition of the Armada, so
the Spanish were victims of the unfortunate circumstances, which is
ironic as they called their fleet the “most fortunate Armada”. Thus “The
most Fortunate Armada” was not fortunate at all. From the very begin-
ning the enterprise was accompanied by disasters, as a storm scattered
the fleet shortly after it had left from Corunna (La Coruña).6 Later, it
was only crawling toward its aim due to the lack of a strong back-
wind. After the battle at Gravelines (8th August) the wind started to
push the Spanish fleet towards the shallow and deadly waters of the
3 R. HUTCHINSON, The Spanish Armada, London 2013, p. 165.
4 Ibidem, p. 202.
5 See J. B. SZABÓ, Mohács. Régi kérdések – új válaszok. A Magyar Királyság hadserege az
1526. évi mohácsi csatában, Budapest 2016.
6 HUTCHINSON, p. 109.
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Dutch coast.7 Finally, the wind changed and saved the Spanish this
time, but pushed them towards the North Atlantic, forcing them to
skirt around the British islands on the savage, unknown and danger-
ous waters of the North Atlantic. Because of the storms near the Irish
coasts, around 60 ships were sunk, while only 5 ships were scuttled by
the English fleet during the dogfights in the channel and the battle at
Gravelines.8 Historical studies confirm that in the late summer of 1588
the weather was the worst in the century.9 What’s more, the Spanish
Empire definitely did not collapse as it could muster four more ar-
madas (1596, 1597, 1598, 1601)10 and was able to finance them. As Si-
mon Adams writes: “A further fifteen years of hostilities lay ahead, but the
Anglo-Spanish maritime war now became only a part of a much wider conflict
in which the struggle for France was the vital theatre. The English made two
major landings on the Iberian coast (at Lisbon in 1589 and Cadiz in 1596),
and the Spaniards a raid on Cornwall in 1595 and a landing in Ireland in
1601, but none of these had any decisive effect. The Anglo-Spanish war was to
all intents a stalemate, for neither side was able to attack the other effectively,
but even this result showed that there were limits to Spanish power. On a one
to one basis England was clearly much weaker than Spain, but Elizabeth had
demonstrated successfully that of all Philip’s contemporaries in Europe she
was the most dangerous enemy.”11 In addition, the latest economic study
claims: “Philip’s debts did not exceed future discounted primary surpluses.
Rising debt was met with rising revenue. Contrary to received wisdom, Philip
II’s debts were sustainable throughout his reign. Castile’s fiscal position only
weakened after the defeat of the ‘Invincible Armada,’ and this deterioration
was mild. Far from being undermined by reckless spending and weak fiscal
institutions, Castile’s finances mainly suffered large, temporary shocks as a
7 J. BARRATT, Armada 1588. The Spanish Assault on England, Barnsley 2005, pp. 110–
111.
8 It is part of the common knowledge as even the English Wikipedia page admits: “As
a result, more ships and sailors were lost to cold and stormy weather than in direct combat.”
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanish_Armada#Historiography).
9 See K. S. DOUGLAS – H.H. LAMB – C. LOADER, A Meteorological Study of July to
October 1588: The Spanish Armada Storms, Norwich 1978; S. DAULTREY, The Weather
of North-West Europe during the Summer and Autumn of 1588, in: P. GALLAGHER
– D.W. CRUICKSHANK (eds.), God’s Obvious Design. Papers for the Spanish Armada
Symposium, Sligo, 1988, London 1990, pp. 113–141.
10 See: W. GRAHAM, The Spanish Armadas, London 1972.
11 S. ADAMS, The Spanish Armada (http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/tudors/
adams_armada_01.shtml).
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result of military events. [. . .] Our findings suggest that earlier assessments
of Philip’s finances have been too pessimistic.”12
If we accept that the English did not defeat the Armada and the fail-
ure of the expedition was only a battle and an incident among many
other wars waged by the Spanish Empire, then the obvious conclusion
is that only the English reception attached special significance to this
affair, in other words, it created the symbol of the fall of the Spanish
Armada which became a strong pillar of English national pride, iden-
tity and patriotism.
For the author of this study, it is not difficult to accept the axioms
mentioned above as he is not affected by English patriotic feelings and
cultural indoctrination. However, for English historians it may not be
evident, which is marked by the fact that the first monograph in En-
glish language claiming the statements above was written by a Span-
ish historian. Nevertheless, the book of Felipe Fernández-Armesto
was not condemned by English historians for his approach13 since
the 20th century-English historiography has critical tendencies on the
topic, but it does not question the basic English axiom that the En-
glish fleet defeated the Armada. On the contrary, the conclusion of
Fernández–Armesto was that the fall of the Armada represents only
a strategic failure and a single episode in the 16th-century history of
warfare.14 He also claims that the Armada was defeated by the stormy
weather and not by the English efforts.15 As Fernández–Armesto does
not attach too much importance to the fall of the Armada in 1588, he
also doubts that this event would have marked the beginning of the
rise the English naval superpower.
Consequently, this study supposes that the way English historiog-
raphy and reception regards the Spanish Armada is not correct or is
incorrect but a result of nearly five hundred years of evolution during
12 M. DRELICHMAN – H. J. VOTH, The Sustainable Debts of Philip II. A Reconstruc-
tion of Castile’s Fiscal Position, 1566–1596, in: The Journal of Economic History, 4, 2010,
pp. 814–815.
13 The only one exception is: G. PARKER, The Spanish Armada: The Experience of War
in 1588. by Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, in: The Journal of Military History, 2, 1990, pp.
233–234.
14 F. FERNÁNDEZ-ARMESTO, The Spanish Armada. The Experience of War in 1588, Ox-
ford 1988, pp. 6–7.
15 Ibidem, pp. 268–269.
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which the Armada appeared in political speeches, historiography, lit-
erature, secondary school education and journalism.16
Writing a summative study on this topic including English historio-
graphy is also justified, firstly because monographs on the Spanish
Armada do not summarise their historiographic precedents and there
is only one (as far as the author knows) summary on them written
by Euegene L. Rasor. 17 Secondly, monographs and studies on English
national identity only mention the role of the Spanish Armada.18
English Political Interpretations of the Success
The English had to find an explanation to the failure of the Armada.
The first one was of religious nature. The saying “Jehovah blew with His
winds, and they were scattered” (“Flavit Deus et dissipati sunt”) became a
well-known phrase after the victory, when the Spanish fleet was bro-
ken up by a storm which was also called “the Protestant Wind”. The
quotation seems to have had its origin in an inscription on one of the
many commemorative medals minted to celebrate the occasion.
This kind of religious argumentation also appears in Queen Eliza-
beth I’s speech which she delivered at Tilbury a week after the battle at
Gravelines, when the Armada was heading back to Spain. “[. . .] I have
always so behaved myself that under God I have placed my chiefest strength
and safeguard in the loyal hearts and goodwill of my subjects. Wherefore I am
come among you at this time not for my recreation and pleasure, but being
resolved in the midst and heat of battle to live and die amongst you all to lay
down, for my God and for my kingdom and for my people, my honour and
my blood even in the dust. [. . .] Not doubting but by your concord in the
16 This study does not analyse films and radio programmes on the topic, as it focuses
on written sources.
17 E. L. RASOR, The Spanish Armada of 1588: Historiography and Annotated Bibliography,
London 1993.
18 K. KUMAR, The Making of English National Identity, Cambridge 2003, p. 162. See oth-
ers in general on nationalism: G. SLUGA, Identity, Gender, and the History of Eu-
ropean Nations and Nationalisms, in: Nations and Nationalism, 1, 1998, pp. 87–111;
D.M. ROTHÌ, National Attachment and Patriotism in a European Nation: A British
Study, in: Political Psychology, 1, 2005, pp. 135–155; H. KOHN, The Genesis and Char-
acter of English Nationalism, in: Journal of the History of Ideas, 1, 1940, pp. 69–94; M.
RODRÍGUEZ–SALGADO, Christians, Civilised and Spanish: Multiple Identities in
Sixteenth-Century Spain, in: Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 8, 1998, pp.
233–251.
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camp and valour in the field and your obedience to myself and my general,
we shall shortly have a famous victory over these enemies of my God and
of my kingdom.”19 The speech itself is meticulously analysed by Janet
M. Green who says that: “The Tilbury oration is the prize of Elizabeth’s
succinct English mode. It is a demonstrative (or epideictic or declamatory)
oration, a type that could express praise or blame, and the shortest formal
address of Elizabeth’s we have. About 250 words, it takes about two and one-
half minutes to deliver. Most Elizabethan orators spoke, in church and in
Parliament, for at least an hour, but Elizabeth did not like other people’s long
harangues. In her own orations she was unusually brief. Her main purpose
in speaking was to set forth the royal will and message, and for this, she did
not need a great deal of talking.”20 On the other hand, many historians
consider this speech delivered on 18th August as a cynical and hypo-
critical act of propaganda since there was no imminent danger any
more, and the English ground forces were disbanded a day later.21
What’s more, Susan Frye claims that Elisabeth did not give her speech
at all, although she admits that: “While the spatial association of Elizabeth
with the defeat of the Armada remained important after her death, Elizabeth’s
arms and armour became increasingly important to her seventeenth-century
iconography. William Rogers’ engraving of a peaceful if triumphant empress,
so rarely reproduced, contrasts with the better-known allegorical engraving
of Thomas Cecil, ‘Truth Presents the Queene with a Lance’ (c. 1625) [. . .],
which, while the Armada is defeated in the background, an armoured Eliz-
abeth receives a lance and tramples the dragon of Catholicism. The picture
is an allegory, but, like Spenser’s Britomart, it provides us with image that
is difficult not to superimpose on Elizabeth at Tilbury. Seventeenth-century
history plays about Elizabeth illustrate a similar increase in the Queen’s mil-
itarism.”22 The other question connected to the Tilbury-speech is what
19 HUTCHINSON, pp. 179–180. About the Tilbury speech: A. J. COLLINS, The Progress
of Queen Elizabeth to the Camp at Tilbury, 1588, in: The British Museum Quarterly, 4,
1936, pp. 164–167; S. FRYE, TheMyth of Elizabeth at Tilbury, in: The Sixteenth Century
Journal, 1, 1992, pp. 95–114; J.M. GREEN, “I My Self”, Queen Elizabeth I’s Oration at
Tilbury Camp, in: The Sixteenth Century Journal, 2, pp. 421–445; R. LEICESTER – M.
CHRISTY, Queen Elizabeth’s Visit to Tilbury in 1588, in: The English Historical Review,
133, 1919, pp. 43–61.
20 GREEN, p. 423.
21 N. HANSON, The Confident Hope of a Miracle. The True Story of the Spanish Armada,
London 2004, p. 522.
22 FRYE, p. 108.
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would have happened if the Spanish had landed? The majority of the
Hungarian historians stigmatize the question, “What if?” However,
it is justified as contemporaries had to evaluate the consequences of
their actions, so they often asked what would have happened if they
had done something this way or in the other way around. Even at the
height of English patriotism it was claimed that the English ground
forces would not have had even the slightest chance against the Span-
ish: “Truly they [burghers of London] and the rest of the English militia
would have been as chaff before the veterans of Parma. It was clearly then
to her fleet that Elizabeth had alone to look for the safety of herself and her
subjects; yet she laboured hard to render even its bravery and skill unavail-
ing. In evil plight the crews went forth to meet the enemy, whose power they
had throughout feared less than the dangers to which their own sovereign had
exposed them; and in still worse plight they returned from that memorable
conflict, thinned by the pestilence which their poisonous rations had bred, till
in some ships there were not men enough left to weigh anchor. Even then the
survivors could not obtain their long arrears of pay, or much prospect of an
alleviation of their sufferings. It was indeed small policy, as Howard perhaps
ironically suggested, to defer their pay till none were left to claim it, because
in that case it went to the relatives.”23 Other historians also represented
this theory.24 They were opposed by those who claimed that the En-
glish defense forces were well-prepared for the onslaught: “[. . .] the
Spanish army could not possibly have faced the combined armies of Leicester
and Hunsdon outside of London before August 14. By that time the English
forces would have numbered at least 46,000 men, having been reinforced by
a further 17,000 due to arrive from the counties on August 12. Finally, this
does not include the approximately 20,000 men from the southwest who, if
they continued shadowing the Armada along the coast, would be approach-
ing the area of battle by August 14, possibly even threatening Parma from the
flank and rear. While the outcome of such a battle would have been far from
certain, especially considering the dissension in the English command, the
inexperience of the English troops, and the apparent awe in which the earl of
Leicester held Parma, the Spanish army would have been attacking an army
nearly twice its own size, a challenge that not many commanders as skilled as
23 H. HALL, The Imperial Policy of Elizabeth. From the State Papers, Foreign and Do-
mestic. Discussion, in: Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 3, 1886, p. 232.
24 HUTCHINSON, p. 210; MC ALEER, pp. 604–605; G. PARKER, If the Armada had
Landed, in: History, 203, 1976, pp. 358–368.
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Parma would have cared to undertake. [. . .]While the queen’s visit to Tilbury
and the celebrations that followed focused popular attention on Leicester’s
muster, they have obscured the more effective measures taken for the defence
of England during the days of crisis. Hunsdon’s army and the forces on the
South coast have been very nearly forgotten, lost in a pile of state papers and
muster books. Even more surprising, the use of extensive planning to meet
the challenge of invasion has been largely over-looked, despite the fact that it
reflects the administrative skill of Elizabeth’s government. Always careful of
excessive expenditure, the queen and her council had found a way to conserve
resources, particularly precious financial resources, by avoiding early mobi-
lization. [. . .] By taking gambles such as this, Elizabeth was able to avoid the
kind of financial disaster that eventually wrecked Philip II’s war effort.”25
The topic of the Armada often appears in political speeches in the
20th century as well. These speeches echo the patriotic viewpoint on
the Armada and use it as a model of English national character. For ex-
ample, Stanley Baldwin’s speech in 1929: “The new world, when it came
into being, acted as the force of gravity on the old, and it dragged new world
empires in its train. More than three centuries ago – more than four centuries
ago – when Henry VII was building his Chapel at Westminster, Columbus of
Spain and Vasco da Gama of Portugal sought the new world across the seas,
and at that moment, although we knew it not, our destiny was conceived in
the womb of time. Slowly our seamen were pushing their way into Arctic
seas, our sailors were raiding Spanish settlements, and in that struggle they
learnt their seamanship, and they brought to that seamanship the courage
and audacity of their race. England had been but a few centuries, as history
goes, the home of those who had pushed their way from Scandinavia and the
Teutonic forests, and once more they felt the urge of the South Seas to the new
world open to them. The urge was upon them again, the call came upon them
once more. Our apprenticeship of the sea concluded with the Armada, and at
that time unconsciously the soul of the nation turned aside from Europe and
cast out to sea.”26 Later Clement Attlee says in his Memorial Speech to
Winston Churchill (1965) that “I think of him also as supremely conscious
25 J. S. NOLAN, TheMuster of 1588, in:Albion, A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British
Studies, 3, 1991, pp. 406–407. The same standpoint is confirmed by N. YOUNGER,
If the Armada Had Landed: A Reappraisal of England’s Defences in 1588, in: His-
tory, 3, 2008, pp. 328–354 (https://classroom.kleinisd.net/users/1243/docs/if_the_
armada_had_landed.pdf).
26 http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=90.
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of history. His mind went back not only to his great ancestor Marlborough
but through the years of English history. He saw himself and he saw our na-
tion at that time playing a part not unworthy of our ancestors, not unworthy
of the men who defeated the Armada and not unworthy of the men who de-
feated Napoleon. He saw himself there as an instrument. As an instrument
for what? For freedom, for human life against tyranny. None of us can ever
forget how, through all those long years, he now and again spoke exactly the
phrase that crystallised the feelings of the nation.”27 Strategically, it was
a very creative idea to connect Churchill with the fall of the Armada
and Napoleon as one of the favourite cats of Churchill was called Nel-
son,28 named after Admiral Nelson who died in the battle at Trafalgar.
In addition, the Armada appears in David Steel’s speech in 1986: “I
do not doubt that when the Spaniards of the 16th century planned their Ar-
mada there were many who discussed in the minutest detail the galleons and
guns that were to reduce England to servitude. These preoccupations hid from
them the truth of Spain’s national weakness – the sterility of its social order,
the bankruptcy of its economy.”29 This one mirrors the English common
thinking, however, English historiography confuted every sentence of
it: there was only the Spanish king Philip II (1556–1598) who com-
piled one master plan out of the plans his subordinates had designed,
and even this one could not answer the most important question: how
will the Armada and the ground forces of Parma rendezvous. So, not
the “minutest detail”, but even the biggest problem was not solved.30
The aim of the Armada is questionable as the duke of Medina Sido-
nia carried a secret letter in which Philip claimed that the aim was to
force England to pay reparations to Spain, stop supporting the Nether-
lands and allow religious freedom for Catholics in England.31 That’s
why Colin Martin states that the Armada was only a bluff made up
by Philip II.32 In addition, Spain did not go bankrupt, as is mentioned
above.
27 http://www.ukpol.co.uk/clement-attlee-1965-memorial-speech-to-winston-
churchill/.
28 http://www.thegreatcat.org/cats-20th-century-history-sir-winston-churchills-
cats/.
29 http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=48.
30 HUTCHINSON, pp. 29–33.
31 J. DE LAMAR, The Spanish Armada: The Worst-Kept Secret in Europe, in: The Six-
teenth Century Journal, 4, 1988, p. 641.
32 C. MARTIN, Full Fathom Five. Wrecks of the Spanish Armada, London 1975, p. 232.
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It is common in the analysed political speeches that they reflect na-
tional pride and handle facts and interpretations quite generously.
Major Narratives of the English Historiography
By the 19th century, this protestant interpretation was interlocked with
English patriotism, and resulted in the following type of argumenta-
tion: “[. . .] gratitude to God, who frustrated the purposes of our enemies
and detected the treacheries of the Church of Rome.”33 Although this view-
point ceased to exist in professional historical writings, it appears at
the level of vox populi. It’s opposite, the catholic religious interpreta-
tion also exists: “Among the many side-issues which meet the student of the
history of the Armada, that of the cooperation or favour of the Pope, and of the
Catholic party among the English, is naturally important for Catholics. There
can be no doubt, then, that though the Spanish predominance was not at all
desired for its own sake by the Catholics of England, France, and Germany,
or of Rome, yet the widespread suffering and irritation caused by the reli-
gious wars Elizabeth fomented, and the indignation caused by her religious
persecution, and the execution of Mary Stuart, caused Catholics everywhere
to sympathize with Spain, and to regard the Armada as a crusade against
the most dangerous enemy of the Faith. [. . .] Great as were the effects of the
failure of the Armada, they are nevertheless often exaggerated. The defeat no
doubt set bounds on the expansion of Spain, and secured the power of her
rival. Yet it is a mistake to suppose that this change was immediate, obvious,
or uniform. The wars of religion in France, promoted by Elizabeth, ended in
weakening that country to such an extent that Spain seemed within two years
of the Armada to be nearer to universal domination than ever before, and this
consummation was averted by the reconciliation of Henry IV to Catholicism,
which, by reuniting France, restored the balance of power in Europe, as was
acknowledged by Spain at the peace of Vervins in 1598.”34
33 T. LATHBURY, The Spanish Armada, A.D. 1588, or the Attempt of Philip II and Pope
Sixtus V to Re-establish Popery in England, London 1840, p. 21.
34 The Spanish Armada (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/01727c.htm). From the
very beginning, the catholic interpretation was present besides the protestant. E. g.
“The Spanish defeat have set in motion a vigorous reaction against Spanish hegemony in Eu-
rope. A major reason that this did not happen was the religious factor. The Armada, although
launched for a combination of reasons, sailed under the aura of a religious crusade.” R. E.
SCULLY, “In the Confident Hope of a Miracle”: The Spanish Armada and Religious
Mentalities in the Late Sixteenth Century, in: The Catholic Historical Review, 4, 2003,
pp. 643–657. And “In 1588, Pope V sent forth the Spanish Armada with his blessing the
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Taking look at Elisabeth I’s speech at Tilbury, the state-planned in-
doctrination and propaganda is also visible. It was so effective that it
could define the interpretations of future times. During the following
four months several – mainly false – aspects of later reception were
born:
1. the arrogant Spanish called their armada invincible. It is not true,
it was called grand or most fortunate armada.
2. The English Catholics fought against the Spanish in unison with
their protestant English fellows. It is not correct, either. Many
Catholics supported the Spanish.
3. It was the battle of David and Goliath, the small English fleet
against the huge Spanish Armada. In fact, the English fleet was
at least as numerous as the Spanish.
4. God supported the protestants by his storms.35
The 1st Baron of Burghley, the chief advisor of Elizabeth I, William
Cecil (1520–1598) asked William Camden (1551–1623) in 1597 to write
the chronicle of the reign of Elizabeth I. The bookwas published in En-
glish only in 1625: “The elaborately symbolic title page of the 1625 Annales
highlights the hagiographical nature of Camden’s text. Its woodcut border
portrays events that shaped the heroic myth of an Elizabethan ‘golden age’ of
imperialistic triumph: Sir Francis Drake’s circumnavigation of the globe in
1577–79, his 1587 attack on Cadiz, the defeat of the Spanish Armada in I588,
the earl of Cumberland’s 1591 raid on San Juan de Puerto Rico, and the 1596
hope that it would accomplish the long-threatened invasion of England which would depose
Elizabeth. William Allen, a man of ability and of character, who thought that the restoration
of England to papal control was the highest patriotism, had been made a Cardinal at the re-
quest of Philip II Spain of before the despatch of the Armada, so that when the conquest of
England was accomplished he might reorganize the Church of England on a Roman basis. It
was the last attempt of a foreign prince to conquer England for the pope. After the prospect
of England’s return to Roman obedience was a fading ecclesiastical vision. English Roman
Catholics were thoroughly divided as to the particular policy which should followed [. . .]”
H.M. SHIRES, The Conflict between Queen Elizabeth and Roman Catholicism, in:
Church History, 4, 1947, p. 228.
35 B. T.WHITEHEAD, Brags and Boasts. Propaganda in the Year of the Armada, Stroud 1994,
p. XI.
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Cadiz expedition of the earl of Essex. Inset portrayals of naval scenes illus-
trate these events along with stentorian captions like ALBIONS COMFORT,
IBERIAS TERROR.”36
The book written by John Pine (1690–1756),37 following the 16th-
century-interpretation also considers the fall of the Armada as the
most significant event in the history of the English nation.38 It distin-
guishes real causes and pretexts of the Spanish enterprise. After that,
it meticulously and factually (lacking religious aspects) describes the
events in a manner and structure (causes, number of the two fleets,
dogfights on sea, the Battle at Gravelines, numbers of losses and con-
sequences) which is followed by even nowadays. From the 18th cen-
tury on, most of the monographs follow this fashion of writing on the
Armada.
English patriotism reached its peak during the 19th century, and the
tercentenary of the fall of the Armada (1588) also gave birth to many
writings such as poems,39 popular historical books for young read-
ers,40 historical monographs41 as well as source publications.42 In the
latter, Laughton argued against the “Flavit Deus et dissipati sunt.” the-
36 J.N. KING, Queen Elizabeth I: Representations of the Virgin Queen, in: Renaissance
Quarterly, 1, 1990, pp. 69–70.
37 English engraver. J. PINE, The Tapestry Hangings of the House of Lords: representing the
several engagements between the English and Spanish fleets, in the [. . .] year MDLXXXVIII,
with the portraits of the Lord High-Admiral, and the other noble commanders, taken from the
life. To which are added, from a book entitled, Expeditionis Hispanorum in Angliam vera
descriptio, A.D. 1588 [. . .], London 1739. The historical notes were written by the his-
torian Philip Morant (1700–1770).
38 Ibidem, p. 1.
39 “For, while the flota hither sailed,
Drake sent out burning ships,
Then, fiery missiles on them hailed,
And blew their hulls to chips
[. . .]”
Excerpt from: C. ALFIERI, The Memory Work of the Battles and Sieges and English
History, on a System on Mnemonics and Essay Rhymes, including the chronology of the
sovereigns on England, and an account of the principal battles in which the country has been
engaged, from the Norman Conquest to the Battle of Waterloo, Hanley 1880, p. 40.
40 W.P. NIMMO, In the brave days of old: or, the story of the Spanish Armada, in the Year of
Grace 1588. For Boys and Girls, Edinburgh 1871.
41 F. JONES, The Life of Sir Martin Frobisher, Knight. Containing a Narrative of the Spanish
Armada, London 1878.
42 J. K. LAUGHTON (ed.), State Papers relating to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada, anno
1588. Vol. I–II, [London] 1894.
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ory, as the Spanish fleet was defeated before the divine help. This state-
ment is questionable, as the wind prevented the Spanish frommoving
fast against England, what’s more, in July a storm scattered the fleet
during their voyage. In addition, strictly speaking, the English fleet
did not actually defeat the Spanish, because they could scuttle only
five ships out of the circa 130.
During the 20th century, more critical historical researches and ex-
planations appeared and culminated in the 4th centenary of the fall of
the Armada. In addition, Spanish authors (e. g. the above-mentioned
Felipe Fernández-Armesto) also published their works in English.
Military historians also tried to find an explanation for the Spanish
failure in the battle at Gravelines as the Spanish could not scuttle any
English ships. According to Michael Lewis, the English cannons were
more effective in close-quarter fights than the Spanish ones.43 In ad-
dition, the English cannons were of better quality and the gunners
were more skilled than their Spanish counterparts.44 Colin Martin and
Geoffrey Parker claim that the Spanish guns used smaller projectiles
shot by less power, and the Spanish fired only one salvo, and after that
they made an attempt to board the enemies’ ships, while the English
continuously fired volleys and could move the carriage of the guns
faster and easier.45
Naturally, from an English point of view, there were national heroes
and Spanish scapegoats as well. One of the greatest generals is Sir
Francis Drake, who embodied the English nation itself. “We must not
judge past as if they were possessed of the light and the present. We see in
Drake a rude daring seemed wonderful in his own age. There is not merely
the greedy love of gain, but a desire British flag in seas and lands where
before unknown. The honour of his nation lured it was, he was buccaneer–
discoverer–hero–character deemed great and noble-held up the days in which
he lived.”46
Among the scapegoats, there are the Dukes of Medina Sidonia and
Parma, as well as Philip II. The English historiography systematically
43 M. LEWIS, The Spanish Armada, London 1960, pp. 166–167.
44 M. LEWIS, Armada Guns, a Comparative Study of English and Spanish Armaments, Lon-
don 1961, pp. 190–191.
45 C.MARTIN – G. PARKER, The Spanish Armada. 2nd revised edition, Manchester 1999,
pp. 192–201.
46 Sir Francis Drake, The Illustrated Magazine of Art, 14, 1854, p. 98.
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and gradually became more critical of the English heroes and more
lenient with the Spanish leaders during the last two hundred years.
The best example for the latter attitude is the latest monograph on
Philip II.47
Outlines of the Other Fields of Reception: Literature, Journalism
and Education
From the very beginning, the fall of the Armada had a serious effect
on other fields of English reception as well. In the Stationers’ Regis-
ter there are 27 ballads on the Armada, registered between 29 June
and 27 November 1588.48 They focus on three topics: preparations,
victory and thanksgiving.49 By the end of the 19th century the genre
of ballads declined.50 In English dramas, “[. . .] the defeat of the Armada
symbolized the failure of an empire that had neglected to cultivate the popu-
lation, the commerce, the industry, and the agriculture necessary to maintain
a powerful state.”51 On poetry, there were harsh debates as J. C. Lapp
claimed that English contemporary poets were not interested in the
theme of the Armada: “The spectacular victory which delivered England
from the great Armada inspired no triumphal song among contemporary En-
glish poets. English poetical record of the event was confined to Spenser’s brief
salute to Lord Howard in a dedicatory sonnet to the Faerie Queene, Warner’s
stiff lines in Albion’s England, a rough poem by the Scottish poet, Alexan-
der Hume, and the popular ballads of the day. Curiously, one of the greatest
moments in England’s history received its worthiest treatment in the obscure
pages of Pierre Poupo’s Muse Chrestienne, published in 1590, only two years
47 G. PARKER, Imprudent King. A New Life of Philip II, Yale 2014.
48 “During the period the Stationers Register was kept, of the sixty seven ballads entered there
which dealt directly or indirectly with Spain, twenty-seven, all dealing with the Spanish Ar-
mada, were entered between 29 June and 27 November 1588. Another on the same subject
was registered the following March 1. Only one of these ballads appeared in June. July pro-
duced two, August ten, September four, October one, and November nine. The sudden revival
of interest in November is probably ascribable to the fact that 19 November was set aside by
Elizabeth, in token of England’s deliverance, as a national day of thanksgiving. This fact
would explain also why seven of the nine November ballads appeared between the fourteenth
and the twenty-seventh of the month.” J. J. MC ALEER, Ballads on the Spanish Armada,
in: Texas Studies in Literature and Language, 4, 1963, p. 602.
49 Ibidem, p. 603.
50 Ibidem, p. 611.
51 B. ORR, Poetic Plate-Fleets and Universal Monarchy: The Heroic Plays and Empire
in the Restoration, in: Huntington Library Quarterly, 1/2, 2000, p. 75.
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after the event.”52 This theory was refuted by Bradner who found more
poems, although the majority of them were written in Latin.53
After the defeat of the Armada, journalists immediately started to
cover the topic.54 One of the most famous of them was Robert Greene
52 J. C. LAPP, The Defeat of the Armada in French Poetry of the Sixteenth Century, in:
The Journal of English and Germanic Philology, 1, 1944, p. 98.
53 “Although the Armada was driven out of the English Channel in July, final reports of its
dispersal and of the return of the remnant to Spain were not received until November. In
the remainder of 1588, which in those days meant until March 25 of the following year,
two poetical volumes appeared in London on this subject. James Aske issued his Elizabetha
triumphans, conteyning the damned practizes used ever sithence her Highnesse first coming
to the crowne, which contains an account of the Queen’s speech to the army at Tillbury and
the naval battle with the Armada, and Théodore de Béze sent over from Geneva a collection
of epigrams in various languages which were printed in London on a single sheet. In the
following year three volumes of poetry relating to the Armada were published in England.
The first of these, published both at Oxford and London, was the anonymous Skeltonicall
Salutation, an amusing satire on Spanish pretensions in Skeltonic verse. The second is the
Elizabetheis of Christopher Ockland, a narrative poem of considerable length in Latin. It
formed the third and last installment of a Latin-verse history of England by Ockland, the other
two volumes having appeared in 1580 and 1582. Since the Elizabetheis dealt only with events
after 1582, it devoted a great deal of space to the Armada. The third book is an anthology,
Triumphalia de victoriis Elizabethae, edited by the principal contributor, who calls himself N.
Eleutherius. Who is concealed behind this pseudonym has never been discovered, but from the
contents it would seem that he was a Continental Protestant, perhaps from the Palatinate of
the Rhine. The names of the other contributors are Richardus Hemelius, Iulius Riparius, and
Olympia Frontina. Hemelius probably also was living near Heidelberg, since he published
a poem there in 1613 celebrating the marriage of Princess Elizabeth and the Elector. I have
not been able to locate Riparius and Olympia Frontina. The volume was dedicated to Daniel
Rogers, whose diplomatic career had frequently taken him to Germany. The book was printed
in London by John Wolfe. In 1590 another Latin anthology appeared, this time at Geneva,
which celebrated the defeat of the Spanish fleet. Its first section, entitled ‘Iberica’ contains
eight poems on the Armada, all signed with initials. [. . .] Another volume containing poems
on the Armada was published at Geneva in 1591. This was the Lyrica of the well-known
French Protestant Jean Jaquemot (Iacomotus). In it are two short poems on the Armada which
I have not seen; the only known copies are in Europe. The last poem of any significance on this
subject was the Ad Thamesin of Thomas Campion, published in London in 1595. This Latin
poem in epic style attributes the enmity of Spain to the powers of Hades and develops the
supernatural machinery at great length. The naval battle is disposed of in about twenty lines.
It is by far the most ambitious and most poetical of these Armada Pieces. Another example of
the use of infernal machinery which probably refers to the defeat of Spain is found in the sixth
eclogue of Thomas Watson’s Amintae Gaudia, London, 1592.” L. BRADNER, Poems on
the Defeat of the Spanish Armada, in: The Journal of English and Germanic Philology,
1944, 4, pp. 447–448.
54 “Several Newspapers are still preserved, which were printed in 1588, while the Spanish fleet
was in the English Channel. The earliest Numbers are lost: but it is probable that the publica-
tion commenced in April, when the Armada approached the shores of England; and continued
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(died in 1592) who depicted the Spanish and the leaders of Catholi-
cism as the worst hypocrites in the world.55 His book mirrors the
English common knowledge of the contemporaries that there was a
Catholic conspiracy aimed at destroying the Protestant England.56
Modern journalism is not motivated by the religious interpretations
but by the novelty of a topic. Therefore, the topic of the Armada has
been linked, for example, to the Brexit: “The first thing about the idea of
England as a nation state that governs itself and only itself is that it is radi-
cally new. The Brexit campaign is fuelled by a mythology of England proudly
‘standing alone’, as it did against the Spanish Armada and Adolf Hitler. But
when did England really stand alone? The answer, roughly speaking, is for
300 of the past 1,200 years. England has been a political entity for only two
relatively short periods. The first was between the early 10th century, when
the first English national kingdom was created by Athelstan, and 1016 when
it was conquered by Cnut the Dane. The second was between 1453, when En-
glish kings effectively gave up their attempts to rule France, and 1603, when
James VI and I united the thrones of England and Scotland.”57
The same happened in secondary school education, as in histori-
ography. Until the first part of the 20th century the major aim was to
strengthen patriotic feelings and the topic of the Armada was every-
where in the education.58 This fact is shown by the following allegory
till the alarm subsided, about the end of the year. It was what we would now call an Extraordi-
nary Gazette; published occasionally, by the orders of Burleigh, to communicate information,
or rouse the spirit of the people, during the alarms of that eventful period. It, accordingly,
seizes with dexterity on topics calculated to rouse the patriotism, and even the prejudices of
the nation; and employs that gracefulness of diction, which might be expected in a courtly
publication. One of the Numbers, under the head of News from Madrid, mentions the inten-
tion of putting Elizabeth to death, and speaks of the instruments of torture that were on board
the Spanish fleet; – circumstances evidently calculated to operate on the terrors of the English,
their resentment against Spain, and their attachment to the Queen. The earliest Number pre-
served is the fiftieth, and contains news from Whitehall, of the 23rd and 26th July, 1588.”
Periodical Publications. No. II. Sketch of Their Early History, in: The Belfast Magazine
and Literary Journal, 2, 1825, p. 148.
55 A. ESLER, Robert Greene and the Spanish Armada, in: English Literary History, 3,
1965, p. 318.
56 Ibidem, p. 322.
57 F. O’TOOLE, Brexit is being driven by English nationalism. And it will
end in self-rule (https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/18/
england-eu-referendum-brexit).
58 P. YEANDLE, Citizenship, Nation, Empire. The Politics of History Teaching in England,
1870–1930, Manchester 2015, p. 80.
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at the end of the 19th century: “Alarmists are beginning to cry aloud that
patriotism is declining in our precious native land. It is probably true that
the era of buoyant, boasting patriotism is forever past, but of calm and, if
necessary, obstinately resistant patriotism, there certainly is no lack. Yet the
first indication of a decline of patriotism should be watched for as Elizabeth’s
scout-ships watched for the Spanish Armada, and every resource should be
strained to prove that the lion of patriotic love but seemed to drowse.”59 How-
ever, by the end of the 20th century the interpretation of the expedition
of the Armada became more rational and critical with regard to na-
tional pride.60
Summary: a Few Words on the Hungarian Reception of the Fall of
the Armada61
The Hungarian reception of the fall of the Armada reflects more the
Hungarian historical thinking than what happened to the Armada.
Only two monographs written on the topic were translated into Hun-
garian,62 because the story of the Armada is not closely connected to
Hungarian history.Many of theHungarian lexicons, summative books
on early modern European history, secondary school books and in-
ternet articles do not even question the “taboos” which are bravely
disputed by the English historiography. Therefore, they condemn the
zealotry of Philip II and the Spanish in the name of the leyenda ne-
gra63 and they also claim that the English defeated the Armada, which
brought about the collapse of the Spanish Empire as well as the rise of
the English naval superpower. They do not ask the most interesting
questions of the English historiography: Was the Tilbury-speech an
act of cynicism? What would have happened if the Spanish ground
forces had landed? Did Elizabeth I do everything to prepare for the
war and did she care about her subjects after the war? Was the Ar-
mada defeated by the English at all?
59 J. R. BISHOP, How the High School May Advance Patriotism. Part II, in: The School
Review, 5, 1895, p. 293.
60 C. PENDRILL, Spain 1474–1700, Oxford 2002.
61 See in detail: P. ILLIK, A spanyol armada pusztulása (1588) Historiográfia, identitás, re-
cepció, Budapest 2017.
62 D. HOWARTH, The Voyage of the Armada. The Spanish Story, London 1981; R. WHIT-
ING, The Spanish Armada, London 2004.
63 FERNÁNDEZ-ARMESTO, pp. 6–7.
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